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The set of objectives in reserves management are normally predefined and 
include: protecting the economy against potential external shocks on the current 
account or on capital flows; invest the reserves minimizing the potential of a loss 
and ensuring the availability of international liquidity when necessary. Whereas 
the adoption of a floating exchange rate in theory reduces the need for reserves 
to protect against external shocks, in the context of free capital movements it 
will be a function of the efficiency of international markets. 
 
In practical terms, Reserves Management is a process with a high effective 
complexity. The manager is confronted with the randomness of markets – 
including its own through the impact on the Reserves of Central Bank 
intervention – and the regularities that arise from its guidelines (i.e. credit and 
market risk, as well as liquidity policies) and the foreign exchange intervention 
mechanisms.  
 
Recently, given the increase in the size of the foreign reserves in recent decades 
for some central banks, as a result and in response to globalization and more 
volatility on currency flows, portfolio foreign investment and other related factors 
as contagion effects, the pressure to generate long-term returns has increased. 
However, the goal of increased returns is subdued to the security and liquidity 
objectives in international reserves management. As a result, the process of 
asset allocation and the construction of an efficient set of investment guidelines, 
as well as a risk policy, must be framed by a liquidity policy and, generally, to an 
asymmetric exposure to risk where capital loses are to be avoided in specific 
time horizons; i.e. a fiscal year.  
 
Foreign reserves portfolios have three main sources of returns: benchmark 
returns from asset allocation
1, the profits made by actively managing the 
authorised deviations from the benchmark and the profits from repo transactions 
or security lending programmes, i.e. security loan programmes. 
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Excluding legal and operational risk
2, the main risks affecting returns in foreign 
reserves management are liquidity risk, market risk and credit risk, that in turn 
are traduced in potential loses of the benchmark, the active management of 
deviations and the securities lending and repo programmes – see Figure 1.  
 
 
                                                 
1 It is preferable to use composites of readily and publicly available market indexes in order to foster 
transparency in reserves management. 
2 Which are not compensated in terms of returns  
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The choices on the levels of liquidity, market and credit risks are subordinated to 
the objectives and risk aversion of the Central Bank. In particular, the 
relationships among these risks are constrained by liquidity and risk policies, as 
well as the universe of assets and the maximum risk exposures allowed by the 
top decision-making body, in the case of Banco de la República is the Reserves 
Committee, which is composed by the members of the Board of Directors
3. Risks 
can be managed by modifying the universe of assets and its allocation on the 
benchmark, the active management or the securities lending programmes.  
 
For instance, overall market risk increases when the benchmark has a longer 
duration, more market risk is allocated to the active management strategies or a 
higher duration gap is allowed between the securities loans’ maturity and the 
investments of the cash collateral
4. Similarly, credit risk exposures can be 
modified by including Asset Backed Securities or corporate bonds in the 
benchmark, the active management guidelines or the cash investment guidelines 
of the securities lending programmes.  
 
The process of mapping risk exposures to the expected returns presented in 
figure 1 can be achieved using a 3 step process: the asset allocation, the 
construction of active management guidelines and the definition of the guidelines 
for the securities loans programs.     
                                                 
3 For instance, a portfolio invested in money market instruments (deposits, CD’s, etc) may have low market 
and liquidity risks and high credit risk, whereas a portfolio invested in sovereign bonds will be exposed to 
higher market risk and lower credit and liquidity risk. On the other hand, a portfolio with holdings in 
mortgage backed securities and corporate bonds may be exposed significantly to all the risks. However, one 
could expect it to generate higher returns.  
4 Only overnight investments are authorized at present.  
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2. Asset Allocation 
 
When determining the benchmark arising from the asset allocation, central 
bankers are faced with many challenges including the explicit definition of the 
credit and market risk aversion and the choice of the universe of assets and risks 
allowed in the portfolios. The latter is also linked to the expected liquidity needs 
for intervention or other motives. Preservation of capital is a mostly favoured 
definition in terms of risk aversion, as well as a universe of assets including 
sovereign debt from developed countries. It is advisable that the market risk 
aversion function is defined more precisely, say for instance, loses should not 
occur in a given period with a probability higher than 5% using a predefined risk 
model, with the risk estimation methodology, as well as the sample, explicitly 
defined.  
 
At Banco de la República, a target probability of 5% to record losses with an 
interval between 10% and 2.5% has been decided by the Reserves Committee, 
in order to avoid changing the benchmark too frequently, i.e. a dynamic 
benchmark is avoided. In addition, potential changes to the asset allocation from 
the above mentioned rule are complemented with analysis on inflationary 
pressures’ expectations and asymmetries in the distribution of interest rate 
returns at low interest rate levels. The choice of the universe of assets included 
in the benchmark results from the overall reserves management strategy, i.e. 
liquidity policies, risk policies, the objectives of the active management 
programme, fee schedules, payment options (fixed, performance based or both), 
etc.  
 
Liquidity restrictions inherent in reserves management result in a sub-optimal 
portfolio when compared to the overall market, as some asset classes must be 
avoided or limited in a reserves portfolio. Thus, in order to generate higher 
returns – potentially moving closer to the market’s efficient frontier- two 
approaches can be sought: (i.) increase the threshold of loss tolerance with the 
same asset classes or (ii.) add new asset classes or risks into the acceptable 
universe. The latter can be done by either increasing the asset classes in the 
benchmark or allowing disparate risks for asset allocation and active 
management, which can have complementary or exclusive risks.  
 
When more risks are allowed in the asset allocation process, the resulting 
benchmark will by closer to the market’s efficient frontier. However, the portfolio 
will be synchronized with the additional risks. For example, including Mortgage 
Backed Securities (MBS) will expose the portfolio permanently to prepayment risk 
(extension and call risks), negative convexity, model risks etc. Also, the relative 
value products or spread products tend to trade in less efficient markets. As  
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model risk in those instruments is significant (rationality in the investors cannot 
be readily assumed), issue selection is determinant in the creation of returns
5.  
 
In addition, in the case of an external management programme, external 
advisor’s desired management style is of great importance. For example, Risk 
Budgeting is a decision process in which portfolio construction is based on the 
selection of exposures to different risks factors – with an overall tracking error 
explicitly defined ex-ante – that aims to maximize the diversification benefit 
implicit in the correlation matrix from a set of signals and, if desired, an expected 
information ratio for each risk factor’s strategy – see Figures 2 and 3. In this 
context, for active management, managers’ ability to modify portfolio’s 
covariance matrix is critical in order to maximize the diversification benefit; this is 
more effectively done when all asset classes permissible are not included in the 
benchmark
6, hence the manager has the flexibility and not the obligation to 
expose the portfolio to such risks at times it deems appropriate. 
 












                                                 
5 An investor does not necessarily want to hold the specific instruments of the MBS indexes but model risk 
can be too significant to deviate from those pools. 
6 Although it could be argued that benchmark returns are more easily beat by allowing additional risk types 
in active management, this issue is solved by defining a target of excess returns over the benchmark that 
accounts for the expected long term difference of returns; i.e. 30 b.p. over benchmark returns. I will come 
back on this issue later in the document.    
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But most importantly two questions must be addressed. Are expected returns 
used in the asset allocation processes open to forecasting errors, forecasting 
fallibility? If this is so, for the resulting optimal portfolio the underlying 
diversification benefit could be improved. Is it then possible to obtain a similar 
long-term additional expected return by constructing active management 
guidelines, with additional risk types, that result in overall lower risk for the 
benchmark and the active management combined? This is possible if the 
guidelines can be designed such that they yield an excess return that is 
independent (orthogonal) to benchmark returns. This is to say that benchmark 
and active management returns have low correlation; with the latter attaining a 
very high diversification benefit as the result of the increased degrees of freedom 
in risk allocation. The dynamics of correlations – which are in quite volatile – is 
also a compelling argument as benchmarks are designed to remain unchanged 




Econometric and statistical analysis performed at Banco de la República with 
multiple sets of guidelines for active management have shown that low 
correlation between active management excess returns and benchmark returns is 
attainable with a satisfactory long term excess return consistent with the Board 
of Directors risk aversion. Thus, the asset allocation process at Banco de la 
República is constructed with a limited set of assets – United States Treasury 
Securities, German Government Bonds and Japanese Government Bonds and 
                                                 
7 One could also argue that Central Banks do not have liabilities in such risks (assets) and therefore these 
must be approached with an opportunistic bias in order to increase average returns.   
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active management is set up such that it has low correlation with benchmark 
returns and long term positive excess returns.  
 
At this point it must be noted that the overall currency composition of the 
international reserves reflect the outflows of the balance of payments. Moreover, 
at Banco de la República, liquidity is ensured by using 3 distinct portfolio 
tranches: (i.) the working capital that covers around 2 to 4 normal foreign 
exchange option auctions interventions
8; (ii.) an intermediate tranche, or passive 
portfolio, composed of United States, German and Japanese government bonds 
that do not allow any active management and its size is estimated so that in 
aggregate these first two tranches cover, with a 99% of confidence, one year’s 
intervention
9 and (iii.) a stable tranche subdivided in two distinct mandates 
(benchmarks) with currently four external and an internal managers, whom can 
take active risk by deviating from the benchmarks in its underlying risks or other 
non-benchmark risks. A maximum ex-ante tracking error is imposed as a soft 
target to all managers, combined with specific limits for all risks, sectors, 
counterparties, etc.  
 
3. Active Management 
 
As previously mentioned active management is designed to yield orthogonal 
returns to the benchmarks and a risk budget is allocated to each manager in a 
macro risk budgeting allocation process. The starting point is the definition by 
the Board of Directors of the maximum targeted tracking error tolerated for 
active management, say 100 b.p. per mandate
10.  
 
Two types of mandates were constructed taking into account differences in asset 
management styles – spread and relative value managers in the US and Global 
managers in Europe. The former, the asset rotation mandate, has a benchmark 
of 100% US treasuries and deviations into other asset classes very liquid in the 
US, such as MBS, Asset Backed Securities (ABS), Agency Debentures, low 
volatility Collateralized Mortgage Obligations (CMO) and other instruments
11 
while the global mandate has a benchmark similar to the indexed tranche with a 
higher exposure to Japanese and German Government Bonds in order to obtain 
the desired overall currency exposure. The global mandate managers can deviate 
into supranationals, agencies, and other acceptable bond markets, as well as FX 
                                                 
8 Information on the intervention mechanisms can be found at www.banrep.gov.co. 
9 The liquidity policy also states that as soon as one year’s intervention is covered with less than 90% of 
confidence, if contingency lines are not available or have been used, the third tranche is to be orderly 
liquidated in order to avoid significant exposure to bid/offer spreads widening. 
10 It can also be expressed as total tracking error tolerated for the overall investment portfolio (50 b.p.), 
which is then allocated to the active management tranche. 
11 US Asset Rotation mandates cannot take open FX exposures and are allowed limited deviations in 
effective duration, spread duration and effective negative convexity.   
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risk
12. Both mandates have to outperform the benchmarks by a target of 30 b.p. 
which is linked to a mixture of a fixed and a performance fee schedule. 
 
The overall tracking error
13 authorised by the Reserves Committee is allocated 
between the internal and the external management. The passive portfolio, which 
corresponds to the intermediate indexed tranche, is not given any tracking error, 
whilst the active internal portfolio, with a global mandate, is allocated a tracking 
error that is consistent with its abilities and historical performance. Similarly, the 
tracking error allocated to the external management is in turn split between the 
global and asset rotation mandates and is then allocated to each specific 
manager – see figure 4.   
 
Figure 4 – Macro Risk Budgeting 
  
 
Macro risk budgeting has many strengths: (i.) risk allocation is performed in a 
systematic fashion starting from an explicit measure of risk aversion defined by 
the Board of Directors; (ii.) diversification benefits can be maximized both 
between mandates and styles; (iii.) managers that use risk budgeting processes 
have higher degrees of freedom
14; (iv.) effective use of the risk budget can be 
monitored
15; (v.) the efficiency in the manager’s use of the risk budget can be 
ascertained in terms of risk adjusted returns (information ratios), efficiency in the 
risk allocation (risk ratios) and the ability to manage risk (efficiency ratios); (vi.) 
other sources of revenue – securities loans programmes – can be compared with 
active management programmes . 
 
                                                 
12 Global mandates can take limited FX exposures against the benchmark, as well as effective duration and 
effective spread duration deviations. 
13 Defined as the ex-ante volatility of excess returns 
14 This is reinforced if the covariance matrix is not “locked-in” by including all risks in the benchmark. 
15 It is not uncommon that managers do not actively take risks allowed to them. This can be understood as 
an opportunity cost in the sense that this “unused” risk could be then taken by other manager.  
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It must be noted that the objectives of the overall programme must be clearly 
defined: 
 
•  Definition by the Board of Directors of the maximum tracking error 
permitted for active management.  
•  Desire to increase the return of the international reserves portfolio by, 
say, 30 b.p. in average by enhancing active management under the 
restriction of the maximum tracking error allowed. 
•  Obtain this excess returns from the overall active management 
programme
16. 
•  Design active management guidelines that are uncorrelated (or have low 
correlation) with benchmark returns. 
•  Design distinct mandates to maximize diversification benefits and 
allocate the tracking error to the mandates as a soft target
17 – macro 
risk budgeting
18. 
•  Develop a fee schedule in accordance to the risk/return objectives. 
•  Determine the rules and procedures for manager’s evaluation and 
replacement, i.e. periods and criteria of evaluation
19. 
•  Monitor risk allocation and usage by the managers. 
 
In order to perform these tasks, a comprehensive and robust risk process was 
constructed that takes into account all the universe of risks allowed in the 
guidelines. Moreover a simulation tool, to test in an aggregate fashion all the 
possible exposures to all risks that arise from the guidelines was built in-house. 
  
3.1. Introduction to the Risk models and techniques 
 
3.1.1. Multifactor Risk Model 
 
Banco de la República uses a commercially available multifactor risk model that 
accounts for linear and non-linear factors such as prepayment risk, convexity, 
credit quality, etc. where the  returns dynamics of the returns of asset i,  i r , is:    
                                                 
16 It is understood that at some point in time some mandates may have positive excess returns, whilst others 
may not. The objective is to obtain positive returns for all active management. 
17 A soft target is advisable as, when non-linear instruments (risks) are included in the universe of assets, 
risk measurement will depend on the underlying assumptions made in the risk model – i.e. prepayment 
speed – and therefore risk estimation may differ between the manager’s model and the one used internally. 
We have called this the “Relativity of Risk Issue”.   
18 Risk allocation could be performed completely by the reserves manager by creating risk specific 
mandates (an only MBS mandate for example). In this case the maximization of the diversification benefit 
is performed by the reserves manager entirely. Another alternative is to allow the manager to allocate the 
entire risk budget by giving him the possibility to expose the portfolio to all risks. Banco de la República 
implemented an intermediate strategy by taking into consideration the specific abilities of the managers, i.e. 
asset rotation or global.   
19 At present the evaluation cycle has a frequency of 3 years, although portfolios are continuously 






Where  i a  is the expected return of asset i or the risk free rate,   ik b  are factor 
loadings, i.e. asset i sensitivity to factor k and  i e is the unexplained part of the 
returns.  
 
Under non-arbitrage conditions financial assets prices implicitly include the same 
price of risk for each factor. Thus, supposing a 3-factor model, the price of risk 
or the returns expected by exposing the portfolio to these risks (given by λk, the 
return by each unit of risk exposure to factor K) are constant through all assets 





The expected return is then a function of the price λk of each risk that arises 
from the surprises that are generated by the k factors and the asset exposure 
ik b to each of these factors. 
 
Figure 5 – Aggregated Risk factors 




Although the multifactor risk model covers most non-linearity, a proprietary 
simulation tool was designed to test sets of guidelines, as well as to simulate 
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3.2.2. Simulation Analysis 
  
3.2.2.1 Sets theory in portfolio construction  
 
Portfolio and guidelines construction can be performed easily under sets theory 
representation. In particular, the intersection between assets, risks, guidelines, 
measurement (observer) functions and the resulting exposure to the risk factors 
given the explicit definition of the aversion functions – both for the asset 
allocation and the active management can readily be understood. 
 
Define the universe of assets, risks and measurement tools (observer functions), 
as well as the set of guidelines as: 
 
A : {Universe of assets} 
 
It constitutes all the assets available to the investor, i.e. emerging 
markets, equities, sovereign bonds, etc. Choose a subset a ⊆ A of 
assets that are acceptable for asset allocation and a subset a’ ⊆ A 
of assets that are acceptable for active management.  Subsets a 
and subset a’ can be equal, complementary (a ⊆ a’) or distinct.  
 
F : {Universe of risks} 
 
Includes all the universe of risk factors, i.e. prepayment risk, 
parallel curve shifts risk, country risk, etc.  Choose a subset f ⊆ F 
of risks that are acceptable for asset allocation and a subset f’ ⊆ F 
of risks that are acceptable for active management.  Subsets f and 
subset f’ can be equal, complementary (f ⊆ f’) or distinct.  
 
G : {Set of guidelines} 
 
Starting from the sets of assets and risks defined by the Board of 
Directors (a,a’,f,f’), combined with the explicit definition of the risk 
aversion a set of guidelines for active management is designed (g 
⊆  G) .  i n  t e r m s  o f  m a r k e t  r i s k  t h e y  s h o u l d  e n s u r e  b o t h  t h e  
maximum loss probability tolerated and the active management 
tracking error, searching orthogonality of returns. These may be 
unique or multiple if many mandates are desired.  
 
O: {Set of Observer functions} 
 
An observer function allows to measure specific characteristics for a 
given system, process or asset. For instance, for a plain vanilla 
government bond, duration estimation (an observer function)  
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allows the investor to measure the risk exposure to the risk factor 
of parallel shifts of the curve. Or in an option, Gamma estimation 
(an observer function) is a measure of the exposure to changes in 
volatility. The set of observer functions o ⊆ O is decided by the 
investor and is a function of his sophistication or interest. It is 
extremely important that adequate sets of observer functions are 
defined in order to measure all risks in a portfolio as, for example, 
measuring the risk of a MBS with an observer function set 
composed only of duration measures will underestimate the risk as 
this instrument is also exposed to prepayment risk and negative 
convexity. Thus the observer function set should include a function 




The value of the duration estimation is in fact the exposure (the factor loading 
ik b ) of the asset i to the risk factor k, in particular parallel shifts of the curve. 
Thus from the combination of these sets, the set of exposures to the risk factors 
can be determined (a x f x g x o → b), where b ⊆ B the universe of all possible 
exposures to the risk factors.  
 
Figure 6. Mapping of assets and risks factors to risk exposures 
 
 
                                                 
20 Multiple sets of observer functions can be defined: a universally recognized set (effective duration, 
effective convexity, effective spread duration, percent limits in FX or sector exposures etc) to measure the 
risk exposures implicit in the guidelines that are easily monitored and can be compared with the manager’s 
models and a more refined and comprehensive set that is used internally to monitor exposures to all risks 




It must be noted at this point that as asset complexity increases, implicit 
exposure to additional risks factors is taken and the potential differences 
between one’s model and the external manager’s model could increase from the 
use of distinct sets of observer functions. 
 
Under this framework, simulations can easily be performed as any choice of 
assets, risks and guidelines can be mapped to risk factors’ exposures using the 
proper observer functions, i.e. a portfolio is reduced to a set (a vector) of 
exposures to each risk factor. If guidelines include potential deviations from the 
benchmark the complete set of potential exposures can be created as a matrix of 
all the possible combinations of risk exposures achievable given the guidelines, 
subsets {b1, b2, b3..,bn} ⊆ B. 
 
Simulations are then performed by generating the dynamics of factor returns for 
each risk factor, i.e. the returns series of the prepayment factor, etc. This is done 
in 3 ways: use of historical factor returns (how the exposures of the actual 
portfolio or guidelines would have behaved in the past), statistical (not 
necessarily normal) distributions are fit to the returns histograms or Montecarlo 
simulations can be performed
21. Each risk exposure subset b is dynamically 
multiplied by the generated returns  t j r , in order to generate the portfolio returns 
t p r ,  for at each point in time t,  t j j t p r b r , , . = . 
 
3.2. Results for Active Management    
 
The risk systems described convert sets of guidelines into portfolio exposures 
from which expected returns and risks can be measured. Thus, changes in 
guidelines can readily be evaluated, as well as the integral risk of the portfolios 
including most non-linearity and all possible outcomes from all the possible 
portfolios constructed by the managers. Moreover, the correlation between the 
resulting returns series for the active management guidelines and the 
benchmarks can be easily computed.  
                                                 
21 These can be run keeping the implicit factor correlation.  
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Below some results are presented for the prevailing set of aggregate guidelines 
for Banco de la República.    
 
Figure 7 – Benchmark and active management 
 
 
Figure 7 shows some simulation results for: (1.) the benchmark and (2.) a set of 
portfolios that reflect the benchmark and the active management exposures 
arising from the guidelines. It is shown that the set of portfolios that include the 
active management tend to present higher returns, lower risk or a combination 
of both. This reflects: (i.) the benefits of including more asset classes to the 
portfolio and (ii.) that active management tends to cluster in the lower risk or 
higher return space, i.e. although active management could result in higher risk 
than the benchmark as new risk factors are allowed in the portfolio, this does not 
seem to be the case. 
 
Using 500 potential sets of exposures (portfolios that can be constructed 
applying the active management guidelines
22) and simulating returns for 32 











                                                 
22 Includes only active management strategies.  
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Figure 8 – Long Term Average annual excess return distribution 
   
 
The resulting distribution has a positive skewness. On average on the long term, 
active management strategies allowed in the investment guidelines generate 30-
40 basis points excess return to the portfolio per year with an implicit information 
ratio close to 1. The positive skewness is similar for a one-year horizon – see 
figure 9.  
 
Figure 9 – Average annual excess return distribution  
 
 
However, the expected volatility in the one-year horizon increases so that the 
implicit information ratio is near to 0.5. On average, active management 
strategies allowed in the investment guidelines generate a tracking error of 




                                                 
23 The reader must keep in mind that the tracking error objective is 100 b.p.  
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Figure 10 – Annual tracking error distribution  
 
 
Finally, the correlation between active management exposures and benchmark 
returns is presented in figure 11. It can be observed that most correlations are 
clustered near 0 and the 95% confidence interval includes low correlations 
between -0.35 and 0.34. 
 
Figure 11 – Correlation distribution between benchmark and active management  
 
 
From these results it can be inferred that an active management program based 
on a macro-risk budgeting process, in which the universe of risks taken in the 
benchmark can differ from the ones allowed in active management, can yield 
higher returns while exposing the portfolio to lower absolute overall risk if 
guidelines are designed in order to obtain excess returns that are mostly 
independent of benchmark returns. 
 
It must be complemented however with a minimum threshold of returns over the 
benchmark that is formally related to the fees schedule. Banco de la República  
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has designed a mixed fixed and performance fees schedule. Figure 12 shows an 
example of such a system of fees.  
 
Figure 12 – Performance Fees Schedule 







































































































For excess returns lower than -50 basis points per year against the index, the fee 
will equal a fixed value that corresponds to a portion of the fixed fee normally 
charge by the manager for a portfolio with the characteristics of the one to be 
delegated. For intermediate excess returns the scale depends both on the 
generated and the expected excess returns for the manager. For an excess 
return after some level, say 60 basis points, the performance fee stabilizes in 
order to diminish the incentives for risk taking by the manager. Recall that this 
combined with a coherent tracking error soft target. 
 
4. Conclusions  
 
This document provides insight on the asset allocation process and the active 
management programs designed by Banco de la República for the management 
of the international reserves. It was shown that an explicit definition of the 
market and liquidity risk aversion by the highest level of decision-making, the 
Reserves Committee, as well as the universe of assets and risks acceptable 
facilitates the asset allocation and the active management processes in a context 
of macro risk budgeting.   
 
The construction of active management guidelines is a complex process that 
must take into account the objectives of excess return generation, as well as the 
increase in risk exposure to obtain it. An alternative that allows to minimize the 
expected risk while increasing returns is to create an active management 
program that generates excess returns orthogonal (independent) of benchmark  
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returns and that is in turn consistent with the tolerated active management 
tracking error. Figure 13 summarizes the objectives, constraints and policies. 
 




It was also shown that Banco de la República’s active management was designed 
to have positive skewness and very low correlation with benchmark returns, 
whilst creating the proper incentives for the managers to actively use the risk 
budget with tracking error and capped performance fees that are consistent with 
the expected returns against the  benchmark. 
 
In addition, distinct mandates and management styles enhance further the 
diversification and allow managers to use risk-budgeting based decision 
processes to maximize diversification benefits. The potential variability in the 
diversification benefit is buffered by the intermediate tranche (passive portfolio) 
with the diversification benefit only changing slightly; say from 52% for the 
stable tranche to 51% for the overall reserves portfolios. The size of the 
intermediate tranche is defined such that added to the working capital they cover 
one-year intervention needs with a confidence interval of 99%.  
 
Figure 14 presents a diagram that summarizes the liquidity and risk policies. 
Recall that an additional policy to liquidate the stable tranche when necessary 





Figure 14 – Liquidity and Market Risk Policies 
 
 
Finally, for consistency, the decision process for the internally managed active 
portfolio is also based on the risk budgeting approach. 